Suchergebnisse

COVER PAGE -- TITLE PAGE -- COPYRIGHT PAGE -- CONTENTS -- PROLOGUE -- PART I - THE STRAIGHT HARD WORKERS -- 1 - YOU'RE NOT FROM HERE -- 2 - FLICKERING CANDLE -- 3 - MY DAD DOES DRUGS -- 4 - THE NOBLE FIGHT -- 5 - OVERACHIEVING BITCH -- 6 - UNDERWORLD UNIVERSITY -- PART II - THE COMPANY -- 7 - ORIGINAL VICE LORD -- 8 - BANK OF AMERICA -- 9 - THE NEW PEOPLE -- 10 - RAISING WOLVES -- 11 - I'M THE TRUE ONE -- PART III - SPILLOVER -- 12 - IN THE DIRTY ROOM -- 13 - GARCIA'S ORGASM -- 14 - CORPORATE RAIDERS -- 15 - THE CLEAN SOUL OF GABRIEL CARDONA -- 16 - THE KINGDOM OF JUDGMENT -- 17 - WHO'S THE NEXT TOP DRUG LORD? -- 18 - ALL IN THE GANG -- 19 - BROTHERS OF THE BLACK HAND -- 20 - LESSER LORDS -- 21 - A BONER FOR BART -- 22 - THE VARIETIES OF POWER -- 23 - I'M A GOOD SOLDIER! -- PART IV - PROPHECY -- 24 - LAST MEAL -- 25 - HEROES AND LIARS -- 26 - CAREER MOMENTS -- 27 - CATCH THAT PUSSY -- 28 - TWILIGHT -- PART V - FROZEN IN TIME -- 29 - LEGEND OF LAREDO -- 30 - THE MESSIEST WAR -- 31 - NO ANGELS -- 32 - HYPOCRITICAL BASTARDS -- 33 - ANOTHER MEDIA GUY -- EPILOGUE -- A NOTE ON SOURCES.

Like the postcolonial world more generally, Southeast Asia exhibits tremendous variation in state capacity and authoritarian durability. Ordering Power draws on theoretical insights dating back to Thomas Hobbes to develop a unified framework for explaining both of these political outcomes. States are especially strong and dictatorships especially durable when they have their origins in 'protection pacts': broad elite coalitions unified by shared support for heightened state power and tightened authoritarian controls as bulwarks against especially threatening and challenging types of contentious politics. These coalitions provide the elite collective action underpinning strong states, robust ruling parties, cohesive militaries, and durable authoritarian regimes - all at the same time. Comparative-historical analysis of seven Southeast Asian countries (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, and Thailand) reveals that subtly divergent patterns of contentious politics after World War II provide the best explanation for the dramatic divergence in Southeast Asia's contemporary states and regimes

Abstract: The man who has spent the past three decades doing more than anyone to deny Indonesians the right to elect their leaders has now been elected Indonesia's leader. Riding the coattails and benefiting from the brazen interventions of Joko Widodo, the wildly popular outgoing president, Prabowo Subianto has completed his quarter-century-long political rehabilitation from Indonesia's most notorious human-rights abuser to the world's third-largest democracy's commander-in-chief. The murky circumstances of Prabowo's electoral landslide, combined with the likely prospect that he will rule effectively unopposed, seem certain to accelerate recent processes of democratic erosion in the world's largest Muslim-majority country.

Modern democracies comprise multiple institutions and diverse principles. This can make them vulnerable to "democratic careening," as polarized actors emphasize opposing views of what democracy means and requires. I argue that America's current bout of democratic careening is founded on differing partisan perspectives of the ultimate purpose of government, and whether widespread political participation is necessary to fulfill it. While leftists generally take a gain-oriented approach to government, conservatives are more threat oriented. A byproduct of this foundational difference is that leftists' conception of democracy is participation heavy, while conservatives' conception tends to be participation light. The fact that liberals and conservatives differ on the importance of participation to democracy is a potential source of democratic careening, and the fact that conservatives do not necessarily see participation as a core democratic virtue poses the more serious risk of outright democratic collapse.

AbstractDictatorships are every bit as institutionally diverse as democracies, but where does this variation come from? This article argues that different types of internal rebellion influence the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes. The critical question is whether rebel forces primarily seek to seize state power or to escape it. Regional rebellions seeking toescapethe state raise the probability of a military-dominated authoritarian regime, since they are especially likely to unify the military while heightening friction between civilian and military elites. Leftist rebellions seeking toseizethe state are more likely to give rise to civilian-dominated dictatorships by inspiring 'joint projects' in which military elites willingly support party-led authoritarian rule. Historical case studies of Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam illustrate the theory, elaborating how different types of violent conflict helped produce different types of dictatorships across the breadth of mainland and island Southeast Asia during the Cold War era.

Political blocs and cleavages do not emerge and endure unless political parties construct and cultivate them. When Indonesia democratized in the late 1990s, it appeared that party competition would be characterized by two primary cleavages that had been incubated under Suharto's "New Order": a regime cleavage pitting reformist opponents of the fallen dictatorship against its holdovers, and a religious cleavage distinguishing parties by their views on the proper political role for Islam. Some fifteen years after Suharto's departure, neither a reformist nor a religious bloc exists in Indonesian politics. This is not because reformist and religious themes lack resonance among voters, but because party elites have effectively abandoned cleavage politics by promiscuously sharing power in an all-encompassing party cartel. Party leaders have behaved as if they are more accountable to each other than to their presumptive support blocs, leaving reformist and religious social forces without reliable party champions in national politics. This article traces the origins of Indonesia's "accountability deficit" to the elite deal making that accompanied the formation of the country's first democratic governing coalitions in 1999 and 2001. By promiscuously sharing power across cleavage lines, party leaders fostered voter de-alignment in the 2004 and 2009 elections. This de-alignment has left Indonesian democracy vulnerable to the highly unpredictable politics of individuals rather than the more predictable politics of institutions as the 2014 elections approach, ominously opening the door to populist and anti-system challengers striving to rebuild the political blocs that party elites have recently unbuilt. (Crit Asian Stud/GIGA)

Democracy in the developing world is generally outliving expectations, but not outperforming them. Democratic collapse has happily been a far rarer event thus far in the twenty-first century than it was in the twentieth. Yet it does not exactly ring true to say that most developing country democracies are consolidating. This review essay ventures the claim that political scientists need to transcend their rightful concerns with how and why young democracies collapse or consolidate, and devote more attention to theorizing how and why they careen. It defines democratic careening as political instability sparked by intense conflict between partisan actors deploying competing visions of democratic accountability. Careening occurs when actors who argue that democracy requires substantial inclusivity of the entire populace (vertical accountability) clash with rivals who defend democracy for its constraints against excessive concentrations of unaccountable power, particularly in the political executive (horizontal accountability). These arguments are elaborated through reviews of leading theoretical works on democratic break-down as well as detailed case studies of Thailand and taiwan.